Luther Martin vs. Landholder: Anti-Federalist Warnings on Consolidation and Tyranny

By: Mike Maharrey

 

In a heated war of words, Luther Martin responded to a series of essays penned by Oliver Ellsworth under the pseudonym Landholder, defending his colleague Elbridge Gerry against Federalist attacks and reinforcing key Anti-Federalist warnings about consolidation and the dangers of unchecked federal power.

Gerry and Martin were both delegates to the Philadelphia convention and neither signed the Constitution. Given their prominence and influence, both men found themselves in Federalist crosshairs during the ratification debates.

Gerry publicly outlined his objections to the Constitution in a letter to the Massachusetts legislature, which quickly gained widespread circulation. Among those angered by his dissent was Ellsworth, a staunch Federalist and future Chief Justice, who fired off his own series of essays to discredit him.

For instance, in his fourth Landholder essay, Ellsworth accused Gerry of deliberately framing his objections in “vague and indecisive terms,” dismissing them as little more than baseless insinuations. 

“They rather deserve the name of insinuations, and we know not against what particular parts of the system they are pointed.”

In his eighth essay, Ellsworth took things a step further, calling Gerry’s integrity into question. Claiming that Gerry “introduced a motion respecting the redemption of the old Continental Money,” he accused him of turning against the Constitution in a fit of rage after the convention rejected his proposal.

“As Mr. Gerry was supposed to be possessed of large quantities of this species of paper, his motion appeared to be founded in such barefaced selfishness and injustice, that it at once accounted for all his former plausibility and concession, while the rejection of it by the convention inspired its author with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole system he had formerly praised.”

Luther Martin’s essays in response not only supported his ally’s reputation, but also reinforced broader Anti-Federalist critiques of the Constitution. They offered a forceful rebuttal to Federalist claims, while exposing the dangers he believed the new system posed to state sovereignty and individual liberty.

DEFENDING GERRY

Martin drove straight to the point in his first essay, directly attacking Landholder’s intent. He argued that Ellsworth’s writings were “calculated not only to injure the honourable gentleman in his private character, but also to weaken the effect of his opposition to the government proposed by the late convention, and thereby promote the adoption of a System which I consider destructive of the rights and liberties of the respective states and of their citizens.”

He later called Elsworth’s comments a “most unjust and illiberal attack on Mr. Gerry, and stigmatized him as an enemy to his country.”

Martin dismissed Ellsworth’s accusation outright, asserting that he never once heard Gerry propose the redemption of Continental money. He insisted that no such motion had ever been introduced or even considered in the Convention.

“I never heard Mr. Gerry or any other member introduce a proposition for the redemption of continental money according to its nominal or any other value, nor did I ever hear that such a proposition had been offered to consideration or had been thought of.”

Martin also emphasized that Gerry’s opposition to the Constitution wasn’t a last-minute reaction to a personal defeat. He noted that Gerry had already taken a firm and vocal stance against the system long before the Convention concluded, insisting that “a considerable time before I left the convention Mr. Gerry’s opposition to the System was warm and decided.”

He closed the first essay by making it clear that Gerry’s opposition was not driven by personal grievance, but by deep concerns about the Constitution’s implications.

“Mr. Gerry’s opposition proceeded from a conviction in his own mind that the government, if adopted, would terminate in the destruction of the States and in the introduction of a kingly government.”

Ellsworth sought to portray Martin and Gerry as adversaries at the Convention, hoping to undermine Martin’s credibility and his defense of his colleague. Martin flatly rejected this attempt, making it clear that there were no past grievances between them, contrary to Landholder’s insinuations.

“No ‘extreme modesty’ on my part was requisite to induce me to conceal the ‘sacrifice of resentments’ against Mr. Gerry, since no such sacrifice had ever been made, nor had any such resentments ever existed.”

Landholder specifically noted that Gerry and Martin had different views on representation, but Martin clarified that their disagreement never led to hostility. In fact, he pointed out that Gerry was more willing to compromise than other Massachusetts delegates, who were rigidly opposed to equal representation in the Senate. Martin underscored that these disagreements did not divide them, but rather reflected the natural diversity of opinions within the Convention.

Martin emphasized that his relationship with Gerry was one of mutual respect and cooperation, even when they disagreed.

“In many important questions we perfectly harmonized in opinion, and where we differed, it never was attended with warmth or animosity, nor did it in any respect interfere with a friendly intercourse and interchange of attention and civilities.”

FEDERAL CONTROL

Luther Martin’s essays not only defended Gerry but also outlined both men’s objections and broader concerns about the Constitution.

He accused Federalists of disguising their true intentions, presenting the Constitution as beneficial to the people and the states, while stealthily transferring power to a new national government, rather than a federal one. He warned that this process would not stop at a few minor shifts in power, but would escalate until the states were entirely subordinated to federal control, leading to political servitude.

“The conduct of the advocates and framers of this system towards the thirteen States, in pretending that it was designed for their advantage, and gradually obtaining power after power to the general government, could not but end in their slavery.”

Martin illustrated his warning against centralized power with a vivid analogy that he attributed to Gerry. He compared the Constitution’s supporters to cunning jockeys attempting to break in “thirteen young colts,” – a nod to the 13 states.

At first, the jockeys appear gentle, offering hay and oats while stroking the animals as they eat. Their initial kindness lulls the colts into a false sense of security, making them more receptive to additional control. Once sufficiently docile, the jockeys slip halters around their necks. As the colts grow accustomed to the restraint, the jockeys introduce a curb bridle and bit, gradually asserting more and more control over their movements.

Finally, with the groundwork laid, the jockeys saddle the colts. “Well-booted and spurred, with good whips in their hands, they mount and ride them at their pleasure.” Even if the colts resist “kicking and floundering” at first, they quickly realize the futility of escape and “become as tame and passive as their masters could wish them.”

Through this analogy, Martin and Gerry warned that states might initially believe they retained independence under the new system, only to find themselves slowly subdued and brought under complete federal control.

Gerry believed that the dangers of the Constitution were so obvious that anyone who truly examined it would recognize its flaws. He invoked poet Alexander Pope’s line about vice, suggesting that the new system’s defects were self-evident, requiring no embellishment or exaggeration.

“It was a monster of such horrid mien, as to be hated, need but to be seen.”

His conviction was so strong that he saw resistance as a duty.

Martin quoted him as declaring, “he should consider himself a traitor to his country if he did not oppose the system there, and also when he left the convention.”

SUPREMACY

Landholder attempted to paint Martin as a hypocrite, suggesting that his involvement in drafting the supremacy clause conflicted with his Anti-Federalist stance.

Martin defended his position, clarifying that his goal was not to expand federal authority but to restrain it. He highlighted the dangers of the Virginia Plan, which was the primarily plan in the first weeks of the convention, and would have granted the general government the power “to negative the laws passed by the state legislatures, a power which I considered as totally inadmissible.”

In effect, this was a veto power over all state legislation, and the foundation for a national, rather than a federal system. Alexander Hamilton had also proposed even broader national power, including a president for life.

Martin clarified that his proposed language was “materially different” than the supremacy clause in an effort to curtail centralized power. His wording specifically limited the supremacy of federal laws to those that were enacted “by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of the union,” to ensure that only laws and treaties made “within the bounds of the constitution” would be supreme – without giving the federal government unlimited power to veto state laws.

Martin emphasized that “the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary notwithstanding.”

He then explained that his original proposal was made under the incorrect assumption that state courts, rather than federal courts, would play the leading role in interpreting constitutional disputes.

When he introduced his version of the supremacy clause, the convention had not yet determined whether federal courts would have final authority over treaties and constitutional questions. His “wish and hope” was that such questions would be “determined in the first instance in the courts of the respective states” [Emphasis added].

He envisioned a system in which the states would retain a measure of judicial independence, serving as a check against federal overreach. However, once it became clear that the Constitution would place that judicial power in federal hands, he considered it dangerous.

Martin warned that if the system were adopted as written, “it will amount to a total and unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens of this state, of every right and privilege secured to them by our constitution.”

THE MILITIA

Martin also highlighted Gerry’s grave concerns over federal control of the militia, and warned against “that provision by which the power and authority over the militia is taken away from the States and given to the general government.”

Gerry warned that if this power was stripped from the states, it would be “the most convincing proof” that the Constitution’s true design was to destroy state governments and pave the way for monarchy.

Calling it “the last coup de grace” – the fatal blow – Gerry warned that stripping states of this power would leave them without their “only means of self-preservation,” and warned, “If that measure was adopted it would be the most convincing proof that the destruction of the State governments and the introduction of a king was designed.

Martin echoed this concern, stating that under the proposed system, the federal government would have the power to call out the militia and continue them in service as long as it pleased. This would effectively subject the people “to martial law” and reduce them to “the situation of slaves.”

He also cautioned that the federal government would have the power to train and arm the militia, “the neglect of which they may be rendered utterly useless and insignificant, when it suits the ambitious purposes of government.”

Tying federal power over the militia with other sweeping authority, Martin asked a rhetorical question.

“What state is there in the union whose interest would prompt it to give the general government the extensive and unlimited powers it possesses in the executive, legislative and judicial departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of establishing a standing army without any restriction?”

Without control over their militias, both Martin and Gerry feared that the states would become wholly dependent on – and subjugated by – a centralized national power.

AMENDMENTS

One of the chief Anti-Federalist objections to the Constitution was its lack of a bill of rights, and securing amendments became one of their primary goals.

Martin thought the deficiencies of the Constitution were obvious, asserting, “Almost every one agrees the Constitution, as it is, to be both defective and dangerous.”  

However, federalists generally advised that despite some objections, it should be ratified “in its present form, with all its faults,” because, as Martin described their view, “we may safely rely on obtaining hereafter the amendments that are necessary.”

Martin rejected this proposal outright. He insisted that amendments should be made before ratification, not afterward, arguing that they should be debated “while we have the liberty of acting for ourselves, before the Constitution becomes binding upon us by our assent, as every principle of reason, common sense and safety would dictate.”

However, the Federalists insisted they had to ratify now and amend later because, with all of the varying points of view, various factions would never agree on how to amend. Martin summarized their position: “The sentiments of men are so different, and the interests of the different states are so jarring and dissonant, that there is no probability they would agree if alterations and amendments were attempted.”

Martin pointed out the glaring contradiction in this reasoning. If states were too divided to agree on amendments before ratification, how could Federalists claim with certainty that they would come together to pass them afterward?

Martin argued that the Federalists were pushing for “swallowing the poison” of an unamended Constitution based on the empty promise that “the antidote” of amendments could easily be obtained later.

He believed this was merely a deceptive tactic to push ratification forward without addressing fundamental concerns.

Martin warned his readers, “For God’s sake do not accept of such a form of government as without amendments cannot fail of rendering you mere beasts of burthen, and reducing you to a level with your own slaves, with this aggravating distinction, that you once tasted the blessings of freedom.”

He pointed out that Anti-Federalists wanted amendments “to diminish and lessen, to check and restrain the powers of the general government, not to increase and enlarge those powers.” 

He went on to argue that if the problem was a lack of federal power, “We might safely adopt it” and delegate additional powers later. But he warned that in the present circumstance, putting off amendments until later would pose considerable danger.

“Once power and authority are delegated to a government, it knows how to keep it, and is sufficiently and successfully fertile in expedients for that purpose.”

Governments, he warned, never voluntarily relinquish power. Instead, they are “constantly encroaching on the small pittance of rights reserved by the people to themselves. and gradually wresting them out of their hands until it either terminates in their slavery or forces them to arms, and brings about a revolution.”

He concluded with a stark warning, “that nothing can be more weak and absurd than to accept of a system that is admitted to stand in need of immediate amendments to render your rights secure—for remember, if you fail in obtaining them, you cannot free yourselves from the yoke you will have placed on your necks, and servitude must, therefore, be your portion.”

REPRESENTATION

The issue of unequal representation in the legislature was a frequent Anti-Federalist objection. Landholder accused Martin of “political heresy” because, during the Philadelphia Convention, he argued that “the people ought not to be trusted with the election of representatives.”

Martin said this misrepresented his position. He explained his objection was rooted in his distinction between state and federal governments, not a fundamental opposition to popular elections, arguing that “in a state government, I consider all power flowing immediately from the people in their individual capacity, and that the people, in their individual capacity, have, and ever ought to have the right of choosing delegates in a state legislature.”

However, he saw a crucial difference in a federal system, with the government formed by a union of states rather than individuals.

He explained that “the power flows from the people, and the right of choosing delegates belongs to them only mediately through their respective state governments which are the members composing the federal government, and from whom all its power immediately proceeds; to which state governments, the choice of the federal delegates immediately belongs.”

To Martin, this distinction was essential – federal representation was a matter of state sovereignty, not mass democracy.

PEOPLE WITH POWER

Martin’s fundamental objection to the proposed Constitution stemmed from a deep distrust of those in power. He dismissed the notion that government should be built on faith in human virtue, insisting that history provided overwhelming evidence that unchecked authority inevitably leads to oppression.

He argued that if those in power were always wise and selfless, dedicated solely to the interests of the governed, then there would be no danger in granting them expansive authority “it would be impossible that power could be lavished upon them with too liberal a hand.”

However, Martin dismissed this assumption as dangerously naive. No government, no matter how well-intentioned, could be trusted to act solely in the interests of the people without strict constitutional restraints.

Martin urged his readers to confront the realities of human nature, warning, “We must consider mankind such as they really are,—such as experience has shown them to be heretofore, and bids us expect to find them hereafter.”

Those who govern, he warned, “are and will be weak, erring mortals, subject to the same passions, prejudices and infirmities with yourselves.”

In other words, history repeatedly demonstrates that no matter how noble their initial intentions, those in power succumb to ambition, corruption, or self-interest unless checked by strict limitations.

To Martin, this was a universal truth – Americans had no reason to believe their rulers would be any wiser or more virtuous than those who had governed other nations throughout history.

“We have no right to expect that our rulers will be more wise, more virtuous, or more perfect than those of other nations have been, or that they will not be equally under the influence of ambition, avarice and all that train of baleful passions, which have so generally proved the curse of our unhappy race.”

For this reason, Martin insisted that all governments – no matter how well-constructed – require strict limits. He argued that no matter who holds power, it must be restrained “by such checks and restraints, as to produce a perfect responsibility in those who are to exercise it, and prevent them from its abuse with a chance of impunity.”

To drive the point home, he stated what he called “an incontrovertible truth.”

“I consider it, that whatever by the constitution government even may do, if it relates to the abuse of power by acts tyrannical and oppressive, it some time or other will do.”

PREDICTING THE DANGER AHEAD

While Martin was concerned about what the Constitution explicitly allowed, he was even more alarmed by what it failed to prevent. He fundamentally believed that if the government was given the legal ability to act in a tyrannical manner, history had proven that, sooner or later, it would take advantage of that power.

Taken together, Martin’s arguments amounted to a dire warning. The new Constitution, he argued, did not merely pose a risk to certain states or factions – it threatened the sovereignty of every state in the Union.

“These parts of the system, so far from promoting the interest of any state, or states, have an immediate tendency to annihilate all the state governments indiscriminately, and to subvert their rights and the rights of their citizens.”

For Martin and other Anti-Federalists, this was the crux of the debate. They feared that rather than preserving a balanced federal system, the Constitution would concentrate power in a central authority, reducing the states to mere administrative units of a national government.

Martin’s essays exposed what he saw as the Constitution’s fatal flaw: a dangerous concentration of federal power. He warned that unchecked federal power would erode state sovereignty and individual liberty.

In his view, Federalists, particularly Oliver Ellsworth in the Landholder essays, did not simply defend the Constitution – they actively sought to discredit dissenters like Gerry by distorting their arguments and attacking their character.

Martin argued that the Constitution’s centralization of power was not just a flaw – it was a direct and intentional path to tyranny. He insisted that the time to fix these issues was before ratification, rejecting Federalist assurances that amendments could be added later.

For Martin, history made one thing clear: governments, once granted power, do not willingly relinquish it.

Luther Martin warned that under the Constitution as proposed, Americans would be left vulnerable to the same cycles of oppression and revolution that had plagued other nations throughout history.